

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HQ, 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech)
Camp Red Devil
APO San Francisco 96477

AVBL-C

18 June 1971

SUBJECT: Recommendation for the Award of the Presidential Unit Citation

THRU:

TO:

1. The 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) distinguished itself in combat from 29 January thru 7 April 1971 in northwestern Quang Tri Province during Operation Dewey Canyon II/Lam Son 719.
2. The Brigade distinguished itself during this period by accomplishing one of the most successful missions undertaken in the Vietnam War.

The Brigade initiated the operation on 29 January 1971 under the deception of a standard recurring artillery raid conducted from FSB Vandergrift. On 300001 January 1971 the Brigade attacked on two axis with one Task Force attacking along QL-9 reopening the road to Khe Sanh. On another axis a Cavalry task force initiated construction of what was to be known as Red Devil Road. Infantry battalions combat assaulted into selected areas to seize and secure key terrain along QL-9 between Ca Lu and Khe Sanh.

By 31 January QL-9 was opened to Khe Sanh. A Cavalry Squadron then continued the attack westward to the Laos-Vietnam border securing crossing sites. Brigade elements were continually repositioned and successfully conducted

AVBL-C

18 June 1971

SUBJECT: Recommendation for the Award of the Presidential Unit Citation

area of operation. On 8 February RVNAF forces began to cross the border into Laos from secure staging areas. Cavalry elements reinforced by air mobile infantry were used to screen the northern and southern flank of the Brigade AO. Infantry elements conducted saturation patrol operations throughout the Brigade AO. Air Cavalry and Ranger elements continued surveillance and interdiction operations on likely avenues of approach beyond the ground screen.

Engineer efforts continued during this period to include the construction of Red Devil Drive from Khe Tri west to Khe Sanh. Red Devil Drive was also constructed to the Laotian border. Numerous other roads and tank trails were constructed in western Quang Tri Province adding nearly 80 additional kilometers of road to an area that previously had only one overland route. The Brigade's ability to react to any situation enabled the NVA to be routed each time an attempt was made to disrupt the operation. On 16 March 1-77 Armor, who was OPCON to 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), returned to Brigade control and attacked south along QL-9 to the Laotian border to disrupt an NVA attempt to interdict that vital road. The unit, after gaining control of the road, continued its mission and assisted RVNAF and US forces as they redeployed.

The inability of the enemy to cut QL-9 and disrupt the supply effort, the rapidity with which the route to the forward supply areas was opened can leave no doubt as to the successfulness of the operation.

3. During the operation a total of 433 NVA confirmed killed. The supply routes and support installations were secured, enabling a staging

AVEL-C

18 June 1971

SUBJECT: Recommendation for the Award of the Presidential Unit Citation

area for the RVNAF units engaged in operations in the Laotian offensive to be sustained.

4. A summary of the recommendation for the award of the Presidential Unit Citation and supporting documents are attached.

12 Incl

1. - Summary of Recommendation
2. - Narrative Description
3. - Summary of Strengths and Casualties
4. - Listing of Units
5. - Proposed Citation
6. - Task Organization
7. - Intelligence
8. - Engineer Activity
9. - Signal
10. - Supply
11. - Brigade Aviation and Artillery
12. - Maps and Overlays

Inclosure 1 (SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD OF PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION) (U)

1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) US Army

MISSION:

Open and secure highway QL-9 to wheeled vehicles and establish support installations in preparation for RVNAF operation. Assist Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces in movement to attack positions. Provide support for Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces operations into Laos while continuing security of QL-9 and support installations established in the area of operation.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

Operation Lam Son 719 was essentially a four phased operation. Phase I: Attack west to secure and open QL-9 and seize and secure the airfield and surrounding area at Khe Sanh. Phase II: Conduct a mobile defense of the Ham Nghi area and assist the passage of RVNAF forces to the west. Phase III: Continue Phase II and conduct operations to destroy the enemy in western Quang Tri Province. Phase IV: Assist in the redeployment of RVN and US forces to the east, and on order close at Quang Tri Combat Base.

EXECUTION:

On the morning of 29 January 1971, the 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) undertook one of the most significant combat operations ever undertaken in the Vietnam War. Knowing full well that they would be the first large American force to enter the Khe Sanh area in over two years, preparations were made in secrecy to prevent any possibility of compromise and to preclude any large scale counterattack by the enemy. The operation began under cover of a standard recurring artillery raid conducted at Ca Lu (FSB Vandergrift) by the Brigade. Under this deception, the Brigade was able to position a large force. (See Incl 6 - Task Organization) The first phase of the

Inclosure 1 (SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD OF PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION)(U)
1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) US Army
operation was designed to reopen QL-9 and to provide security for a series of installations. Elements of the Brigade attacked on two axis. One attack was westward along QL-9. Elements of TF 1-77 consisting of A Troop, 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry, and elements of A Company, 7th Engineers moved by foot down QL-9 securing bridge sites and implacing culverts. On another axis, TF 35 with its attached engineer elements attached engineer elements from A Co 7th Engineer construction of Red Devil Road which was to run from Khe Tri westward across the mountains through the Punch Bowl to Khe Sanh. (See Incl 8 - Engineers) Although considered to be an impossible feat, the road was completed in two days. Meanwhile TF 1-11 led by Charlie Company conducted a combat a combat assault into the Khe Sanh area and secured the old airstrip. 3-187 Infantry and 4-3 Infantry were inserted on the high ground along QL-9 to secure bridge sites and key terrain features. The link-up of forces was completed on 31 January 1971, completing a thrust through an area that had been an enemy sanctuary.

The Air-Cavalry Troop was given the mission of conducting aerial reconnaissance throughout the area of operation. The information and fire power provided by two Air-Cavalry Troops proved to be most valuable in insuring the success of the operation. (See Incl 11 - Brigade Aviation) The speed in opening the road combined with the secrecy in the preparation caught the enemy totally by surprise. On 1 February, 1-1 Cav attacked southwest along QL-9 and by 5 February had secured border crossing sites along the Laos-Vietnam border. The enemy attempted to interdict QL-9 utilizing frequent ambushes and attacks by fire on traffic and positions but were routed from their positions each time.

TF 1-77 received heavy enemy resistance in the area northwest and

Inclosure 1 (SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD OF PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION)(U)

1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) US Army

On 8 February, contact was made with a well equipped and entrenched NVA force at XD952554. Elements of 1-61 Infantry advanced on the enemy position as the tanks from 1-77 Armor provided fire support with their main guns and cal .50's. As a result of the action, mortar positions were knocked out and the NVA were eliminated from this key area and numerous supplies captured. Each time the enemy attempted to gain a foothold on any key terrain, prompt action was taken to eliminate the threat.

During the II and III Phases of the operation the Brigade elements were continually repositioned and successfully conducted a mobile defense across an area approximately 50 kilometers by 20 kilometers to secure QL-9 and support installations located in the area of operation. On 8 February 1971, RVNAF forces began to cross the border into Laos in force. The Brigade continued its mission and assisted the movement of RVNAF forces.

Frequent contact was made with the NVA. During a series of contacts from 11 through 16 February, 4-3 Infantry in the area of XD9156, killed thirty-three NVA. As a result of search and clear operations in areas such as this, enemy movement was greatly restricted. Not only were enemy weapons captured, but radios, CW equipment, morse code equipment, SOI items and many other documents. On locating an enemy force, the element in contact would use all available assets to fix the enemies location and eliminate him as a threat to the mission. 3-187 Infantry discovered a bunker complex at XD913545 on 26 February. The unit had been conducting search and clear operations in the area of the find for several days. Thirteen NVA were killed as a result of the action. Twenty four bunkers were found containing 7,000 pounds of rice, 50 pounds of dried fruit and large quantities of munitions.

Inclosure 1 (SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD OF PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION)(U)
1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) US Army

Infantry elements proved to be valuable in restricting enemy activity in areas only accessible by foot. Infantry units were inserted in the area surrounding Ham Nghi. These units provided security and denied the enemy access to key terrain and avenues of approach around the Ham Nghi area. The armored units were used as mobile reaction forces. A northern covering force was established with the construction of Red Devil Road. The construction of the road provided an additional supply route if needed and denied the enemy freedom of movement in an area that had once been his sanctuary. Units of TF 3-5 positioned along Red Devil Road had frequent contact with enemy throughout the operation. Acting as the Brigade northern covering force, the NVA were prevented from moving a large force through the area. By constant repositioning and aggressive maneuvering, the enemy was kept on the defensive.

TF 1-77 was OPCON to the 3rd Brigade, 101st Abn Div (AMBL) 3 March thru 21 March 1971. As Phase IV of the operation got under way, the enemy had increased pressure along QL-9 in an attempt to interdict the road near the Laotian border. TF 1-77 after returning to brigade control attack south along QL-9 to eliminate the NVA from the area and to link up with 1-11 Inf along the Vietnam-Laotian border. During this period the Brigade assisted in the reentry of RVNAF forces from Laos into Vietnam. The Brigade also provided the covering force as RVNAF and US forces redeployed from western Quang Tri Province by 7 April 1971. By successfully securing Ham Nghi and keeping QL-9 open to traffic, the 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) enabled the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces to conduct sustained operations in Laos. During the operation, Ham Nghi was the most active support base in the Republic of Vietnam. Each day C-130's and convoys brought in tons of supplies. These supplies were airlifted to the ARVN forces operating in Laos. By supporting

Inclosure 1 (SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD OF PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION)(U)
1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) US Army
the South Vietnamese a vital supply route was denied the North Vietnamese and
the Southeast Asian Conflict brought closer to an end. The operation was not
only a logistical success for FVMAF but a tactical defeat for the enemy. Each
time the enemy attempted to disrupt the operation, the 1st Infantry Brigade,
5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) inflicted heavy casualties on him. The
Brigade conducted a mobile defense, providing area security to QL-9 and support
installations. The ability of the Brigade to detect and disrupt his activities
eliminated a threat to the successful completion of the operation.

Inclosure 2 (Narrative description: Operation Dewey Canyon II/Lam Son 719 24
Jan thru 7 April 1971)(C)

In the initial phase of Operation Lam Son 719 the Brigade attack west to open and secure QL-9 from Ca Lu to Ta Bat and provided security for QL-9 and critical installations preventing the enemy from successfully mounting an offensive. The main attack was expedited by airmobile infantry assaults to secure Ham Nghi airfield and key terrain along QL-9.

On the 29th of January under the pretense of a standard recurring artillery raid conducted by the 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) from Fire Support Base Ca Lu (YD0048) the operation was initiated. The raid was conducted by an armored task force led by 1-77 Armor with elements of 5th Battalion, 4th Artillery, the Brigade's organic artillery unit, and elements of 108th Artillery Group. The artillery Raid enabled the Brigade to deploy combat forces that were to make the initial attack into their forward areas without alerting the enemy. Ranger Teams had been inserted in the area vicinity of the Khe Sanh airstrip to provide advanced warning of any effort on behalf of the enemy to mass forces. At 0001 hours on the 30th of January the Brigade's mobile CP departed Quang Tri Combat Base destined for Fire Support Base Wandergrift (renamed Ca Lu for the operation). At the same time elements of Task Force 1-77 consisting of A Troop, 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry and elements of A Company, 7th Engineers moved by foot down QL-9 securing bridge sites and emplacing culverts. In preparation for their attack westward the following morning, Task Force 3-5 relocated its CP from the vicinity of Camp Carroll to the Khe Tri area on the night of 29 January. Attacking southwest from Khe Tri to Ham Nghi, Task Force 3-5, utilizing attached engineer elements, began construction of a pioneer trail later to be known as Red Devil Road.

On the morning of the 30th, 1-11 Inf combat assaulted by helicopter into the area surrounding the old Khe Sanh airstrip. 3-187 Inf and 4-3 Inf were combat

Inclosure 2 (Narrative Description: Operation Dewey Canyon II/Lam Son 719 24
Jan thru 7 April 1971)(C)

assaulted along QL-9 to secure bridge sites and key terrain features in the area. On the 31st, QL-9 was opened to wheeled and tracked vehicles enabling the Brigade CP and 1-1 Cav to move to Ham Nghi. Task Force 1-1 then attacked westward along QL-9 opening the road to the Laotian border. The mission was accomplished on 4 February 1971.

As control was established over western Quang Tri Province, the Brigade conducted a mobile defense, providing security to QL-9 and support bases. Armored Cavalry effectively established a screening force, the infantry occupied mountainous terrain. As the RVNAF moved to their forward staging areas they were assisted by the Brigade.

C Battery, 5th Battalion, 4th Artillery moved to Lang Vei, and established a fire support base from which to provide fire support for Vietnamese forces operating in Laos and along the Laos Vietnam border. 4-3 Inf returned from Ham Nghi on the 6th of February and combat assaulted into AO Persian, northwest of Ham Nghi. 1-11 Inf and 3-187 Inf continued security operations at Ham Nghi and in the surrounding area. Task Force 3-5 continued construction of Red Devil Road. A/3-5 & after securing their final objective, the opening of QL-9 from Ca Lu to Ham Nghi, began working north and east around Hill 950 located north of Ham Nghi, to link up with TF 3-5. A radio relay station was established on Hill 950 (see Incl 9 Signal), code named Hickory, and was secured by elements of the 1-11 Inf. During the operation Task Force 1-77 provided security for Ca Lu and QL-9 and assisted RVNAF forces moving westward to forward assembly areas in preparation for their drive into Laos.

8 February marked the beginning of the operation into Laos with TF 1-1 assisting RVNAF forces as they attacked from their forward staging areas into Laos. The lead elements crossed into Laos at 0700 hours. TF 3-5 opened Red Devil Road from Khe Tri to Ham Nghi, a distance of 23.5 kilometers. thus

Inclosure 2 (Narrative Description: Operation Dewey Canyon II/Lam Son 719 24
Jan thru April 7, 1971)(C)

Permitting the establishment of a northern reconnaissance screen which would detect any attempt by the enemy to mount large scale attacks against QL-9 or forward support installations in the area. Construction of positions and tank trails on key terrain features and improvement of road to permit its use by wheeled vehicles was continued. On 10 February, 4-3 Inf moved from AO Persian to AO Leopard. Enemy activity in AO Leopard had increased as indicated by the daily contacts with the enemy while 4-3 Inf was operating in the area. Combined Armor and Infantry operations, heavy artillery, and tactical air support were directed at known and suspected enemy units operating in AO Leopard. On 19 February, 3-187 Infantry assumed responsibility for AO Leopard and 4-3 Infantry was moved to AO Cougar. 4-3 Inf, 3-187 Inf and TF 1-77 contributed significantly to the Brigade's effort to disrupt planned attacks on QL-9 and critical installations in the Ca Lu area. With convoys running 24 hours a day it was imperative that QL-9 be kept open and support installations be secured.

The Brigade Engineers were requested by XXIV Corps to determine the feasibility of constructing a road from Ham Nghi to the ARVN Ranger Group QP located near the Laotian border. It was determined that the road could be constructed even though the terrain was rugged. Construction began on 20 February and a pioneer road completed in 3 days. The road was then upgraded to accommodate wheeled vehicles. (See Incl 8 Engineer Activity).

1-11 Inf continued the security airhead, occupied hills 950 and 1015 and provided security for engineer elements at Ham Nghi. TF 1-1 continued operations in AO Tiger providing area security for QL-9, Fire Support Bases and USAF TACAN. Search and clear operations were conducted north and northwest of Ta Bat and southwest of Lang Ve. TF 1-77 and 3-187 Inf continued to make maximum use of air cavalry, artillery and tactical air support in AO's

Inclosure 2 (Narrative Description: Operation Dewey Canyon II/Lam Son 719 24
Jan thru 7 April 1971)(C)

Leopard and Alley to counter any attempt by the enemy to disrupt the flow of traffic on QL-9 and launch attacks by fire on Ca Lu. TF 1-77 was placed under the operational control of 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) on 3 March 1971. The responsibility for AO Leopard was transferred to 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) on 6 March 1971. 3-187 Inf was then combat assaulted into AO Bob when it came into effect on 9 March. The Brigade operations were characterized by cross attachments of infantry, armor, mechanized infantry and armored cavalry elements to gain maximum flexibility and effective use of available assets.

On 16 March AO Bob was merged into AO Panther and 3-187 Inf was combat assaulted into AO Minx. 1-11 Inf was repositioned along the Laotian border in AO Tom to conduct search and clear operations. Every effort was made by all units to assist RVNAF forces as they withdrew from Laos. Enemy activity increased significantly on 18 March in AO Tiger as traffic moving on QL-9 came under heavy mortar, RPG and small arms fire. As a result of the heavy enemy activity in the area for over a week, TF 1-77 was committed on 21 March to clear QL-9 and link up with 1-11 Inf. TF 1-77 attack westward toward Ta Bat reopening QL-9 after it had been closed by heavy enemy activity for portions of two days. The unit then moved to Ta Bat and began extraction of all damaged US and RVNAF equipment which had been left along the road. 1-11 Inf was repositioned to AO Tom north of QL-9. 1-1 Cav returned to Ham Nghi and acted as a brigade reserve. One troop was placed under the operational control of TF 3-5.

As the RVNAF forces redeployed from Laos, artillery elements in the Ta Bat area were secured as they returned to Ham Nghi. 1-11 Inf was again repositioned to the Ham Nghi area on 26 March and given the mission of providing command and control for Ham Nghi Base Defense. On 28 March 1-1 Cav and 4-3 Inf returned to

RECORDED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Inclosure 2 (Narrative Description: Operation Dewey Canyon II/Lam Son 719 24
Jan thru 7 April 1971)(U)

operational control of 11th Brigade, 23rd Infantry Division. TF 1-77 was then repositioned in AO Cheetah as a Brigade reserve with units strategically positioned in the Ham Nghi area.

As the operation came to a close the 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) continued to conduct a mobile defense, as the RVNAF crossed back into South Vietnam from Laos. Units of the Brigade provided a covering force, for RVNAF and US forces as they redeployed from the area of operation.

On 30 March 1-11 Infantry moved to AO Tiger and conducted search and clear operations until April 3 when they withdrew from Lang Vei and redeployed to the Ham Nghi area as Brigade Reserve. 1-11 Infantry was extracted and returned to Quang Tri Combat Base on 6 April. TF 3-5 conducted a screening operation to the north and west of Hickory, thus covering the redeployment of US and RVNAF forces from the Ham Nghi area. They then redeployed to AO Angora to assume control of 3-187 Infantry which was extracted on 6 April. TF 3-5 upon completion of their mission, conducted a passage through 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) and returned to Dong Ha Combat Base on 7 April. TF 1-77 was the Brigade's covering force and effected a passage of lines through 11th Brigade, 23rd Infantry Division which occupied key positions along QL-9 in the vicinity of FSB Shepaherd and recovered the two remaining AVLB's along QL-9. Upon completion of the passage through 11th Brigade, TF 1-77 passed to the operational control of 101st Airborne Division's 3rd Brigade. During this time they provided the security for elements of the 3rd Brigade as they were extracted from the area of operations. They then displaced from the Ca Lu area and redeployed to Quang Tri Combat Base.

During the operation the Brigade conducted a mobile defense of a 100 kilo-

Inclosure 2 (Narrative Description: Operation Dewey Canyon II/Lam Son 719 24
Jan thru 7 April 1971)(U)

meter front which insured maximum coverage of its areas of operations, thus preventing the enemy from conducting a successful offensive. Recon elements were used to detect and identify enemy buildups which could threaten QL-9 and the forward support installations. Once these threats were identified the Brigade used small firing forces to maintain contact while employing "File on" techniques of massive artillery (see Incl 11) and tactical air support to destroy the enemy. Following the bombardment ground combat forces were employed to search out and destroy the remaining remnants of enemy forces. During the operation nearly 80 additional kilometers of road were constructed in an area which previously had only single lane road from Khe Tri area to the Laotian border.

Through the maximum use of all units of the 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), QL-9 was kept open and support installations were secured enabling the South Vietnamese Forces to conduct successful operations in Laos.

Inclosure 3 (Summary of Strength and Casualties) to Recommendation for the Award
 of the Presidential Unit Citation (U)

<u>Totals Assigned</u>	<u>Friendly Forces</u>		<u>MHA</u>	<u>CAP</u>
	<u>KHA</u>	<u>WHA</u>		
6,600	106	650	6	

<u>Estimated Strength</u>	<u>Body Count</u>	<u>Probable Casualties</u>	<u>CAP</u>
5,500	438 433	850	3

Inclosure 4 (Participating Units) to Recommendation for the Award of the
 Presidential Unit Citation (U)

Part I: Units assigned and recommended for award of the Presidential Unit
 Citation.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Previous US Unit Decorations and Dates</u>
1. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division Mechanized.	29 Jan 71- 7 Apr 71	
2. 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry	29 Jan 71- 7 Apr 71	None
3. A Company 1st Bn, 61st Inf (Mechanized)	29 Jan 71- 7 Apr 71	None
4. B Company 1st B, 61st Inf (Mechanized)	29 Jan 71- 7 Apr 71	None
5. 1st Battalion, 77th Armor	29 Jan 71- 7 Apr 71	None
6. 5th Battalion, 4th Artillery.	29 Jan 71- 7 Apr 71	None
7. 75th Support Battalion.	29 Jan 71- 7 Apr 71	None
8. A Company, 4th Squadron 12th Cavalry.	29 Jan 71- 7 Apr 71	None
9. A company, 7th Engineer Battalion	29 Jan 71- 7 Apr 71	None
10. 86th Chemical Battalion	29 Jan 71- 7 Apr 71	None
11. 48th Public Information Detachment.	29 Jan 71- 7 Apr 71	None
12. 77th Combat Trackers	29 Jan 71- 7 Apr 71	None
13. 43rd Infantry Platoon Scout Dog	29 Jan 71- 7 Apr 71	None
14. 407th Radio Research Detachment.	29 Jan 71- 7 Apr 71	None

Inclosure 4 (Participating Units) to Recommendation for the Award of the
 Presidential Unit Citation (U)

15. 517th Military Intelligence Detachment.	29 Jan 71- 7 Apr 71	None
156. 298th Signal Company.	29 Jan 71- 7 Apr 71	None

Part II: Units attached and recommended for award of the Presidential Unit Citation.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Previous US Unit Decorations and Dates</u>
1. 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry	29 Jan 71- 7 Apr 71	
2. C Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, (redesignated D Troop, 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry on 1 February 1971).	29 Jan 71- 1 Feb 71	None
3. 4th Battalion, 3rd Infantry 23rd Infantry Division.	29 Jan 71- 28 Mar 71	
4. 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, 23rd Infantry Division	29 Jan 71- 28 Mar 71	
5. 1st Battalion, 82nd Artillery, 23rd Infantry Division	8 Mar 71- 3 Apr 71	
6. F Troop, 8th Cavalry, 23rd Infantry Division	29 Jan 71- 28 Feb 71	
7. 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division (AM)	29 Jan 71- 7 Apr 71	
8. 29th Tactical Air Support Squadron, United States Air Force	29 Jan 71- 7 Apr 71	

Part III: Units assigned but not recommended for award of the Presidential Unit Citation.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Previous US Unit Decorations and Dates</u>
Headquarters and Headquarters Company 1st Battalion, 61st Infantry	29 Jan 71- 7 Apr 71	

Inclosure 4 (Participating Units) to Recommendation for the Award of the
Presidential Unit Citation (U)

Part IV: Units attached but not recommended for award of the Presidential Unit
Citation.

Unit

Period

Previous US Unit
Decorations and Dates

N/A